



Factionalization of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia: Transformation of the Leadership of a Terror Organization into a Political Organization

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Submitted: October 4, 2025	Revision Required: November 01, 2025	Published: November 18, 2025
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Abstract

This study analyzes the Majelis Mujahidin mass organization where in its development there were internal conflicts that caused several internal factions and a shift in leadership figures. Based on the support and study of the theory of factionalism, identity politics, and leadership, this thesis aims to find out some of the factions in the Majelis Mujahidin and the shift in the area of da'wah from Yogyakarta to West Sumatera. This study uses two types of data sources, namely primary data sourced from the field, observation and in-depth interviews. While secondary data is the type of data that comes from scientific works such

as books, articles, journals and others related to the context of this research, especially about factionalism and identity politics of the Majelis Mujahidin. While the method in this research is a qualitative-descriptive method that uses a socio-political approach. The results of the study revealed that the Majelis Mujahidin had several factions. The first is the Abu Bakar Ba'asyir faction with a jihadist da'wah style. The two factions of Muhammad Talib where the Majelis Mujahidin in their preaching emphasize study through knowledge. The three factions Irfianda Abidin and Jel Fathullah with political missions. The emergence of Jel Fathullah and Irfianda Abidin advancing in the realm of Indonesian politics is quite surprising for Indonesian Islamic organizations. Both are known to be in the central management structure of the Majelis Mujahidin. As a result, the Majelis Mujahidin, which is well-known as an organization that challenges the democratic system, raises its figures to participate in the contestation in a system that it considers *kufr*. The emergence of political factions in the Majelis Mujahidin certainly shows that their existence is quite massive to this day.

Keywords; *factionalization; mujahideen council; leadership; shifting da'wah; identity politics.*

Abstrak

Penelitian ini menganalisis organisasi massa Majelis Mujahidin, di mana dalam perkembangannya terjadi konflik internal yang menyebabkan munculnya beberapa faksi internal dan pergeseran figur kepemimpinan. Berbasis pada dukungan dan studi teori faksi, politik identitas, dan kepemimpinan, tesis ini bertujuan untuk mengidentifikasi beberapa faksi dalam Majelis Mujahidin serta pergeseran wilayah dakwah dari Yogyakarta ke Sumatera Barat. Penelitian ini menggunakan dua jenis sumber data, yaitu data primer yang diperoleh dari lapangan, observasi, dan wawancara mendalam. Sementara data sekunder adalah jenis data yang berasal dari karya ilmiah seperti buku, artikel, jurnal, dan lainnya yang berkaitan dengan konteks penelitian ini, terutama tentang faksi dan politik identitas Majelis Mujahidin. Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah metode kualitatif-deskriptif dengan pendekatan sosiopolitik. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Majelis Mujahidin memiliki beberapa faksi. Yang pertama adalah faksi

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir dengan gaya dakwah jihadis. Dua faksi Muhammad Talib di mana Majelis Mujahidin dalam dakwahnya menekankan studi melalui pengetahuan. Tiga faksi Irfianda Abidin dan Jel Fathullah dengan misi politik. Kemunculan Jel Fathullah dan Irfianda Abidin yang maju di ranah politik Indonesia cukup mengejutkan bagi organisasi Islam Indonesia. Keduanya dikenal berada dalam struktur manajemen pusat Majelis Mujahidin. Akibatnya, Majelis Mujahidin, yang dikenal sebagai organisasi yang menantang sistem demokrasi, meningkatkan jumlah anggotanya untuk berpartisipasi dalam perlawanan terhadap sistem yang dianggapnya sebagai *kufr*. Kemunculan faksi-faksi politik di Majelis Mujahidin tentu menunjukkan bahwa keberadaan mereka hingga saat ini masih sangat besar.

Kata Kunci: *faksi-faksi; majelis mujahidin; kepemimpinan; pergeseran da'wah; politik identitas.*

INTRODUCTION

Analysis of party factionalization was first developed by Raphael Zariski, who stated that a faction is a group of party members who have diverse identities and goals but coordinate to act as opposing blocks within the party to achieve common goals. From Zariski's view, it can be seen that factions are related to the strength of certain organizations. Factions that have a common identity and work regularly and collectively are a must. Identity politics in Indonesia today is certainly different from the identity politics that initially emerged in the United States. In Indonesia, especially after reform, identity politics is positioned more as a political strategy to gain power by exploiting sentiments of religious, ethnic and racial differences. Indonesia's post-reform democratic transition has changed the shape of Indonesian politics (Ming, 2022; Eric, 2022; Jacques, 2023).

Several Islamic movements in Indonesia emerged because of an understanding and statement stating that Indonesian society, the majority of whom are Muslim, should follow the values of Islamic teachings exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad, including in managing the country and implementing government. This understanding gave rise to various Islamic groups, one of which is the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or often shortened to MMI. This group openly demands that implementing the socio-political system in

Indonesia requires the validation of religion. Islamic Sharia is primarily obligatory for them and for Muslims as a whole (Bukhori, 2023).

The responsibility of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia is to ensure the implementation and upholding of Islamic law as a whole in all sectors including the social and state sectors. In fact, the happiness of this world and the hereafter has been shown by Allah and His Messenger which is reflected in the teachings of Islamic law. This belief must be possessed by every Muslim in his monotheism. For the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, a true human being does not only adhere to monotheism *rubūbiyah* and *asmā' wa ṣifat*, but requires monotheism *ulūhiyah* as its perfection (Budi, 2023). This means that a person's faith and belief must be accompanied by pure obedience to Allah until true happiness is created, namely happiness in life in this world and the hereafter.

The Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia has always been synonymous with Islamic law, this is part of the implementation of worship and is an obligation for Muslims collectively. Islamic Sharia can only be realized with state support. The implementation of Islamic law within the scope of private individuals and households or families is not enough. But it must run on a national scale. The results of the V Congress of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia which was held on 5-7 August 2018 in Tasikmalaya still determined the upholding of Islamic law in the country. However, after the congress took place, two ahlul halli wal 'aqdi figures, namely Irfianda Abidin, ran as legislative candidates for the DPR RI in the electoral district of West Sumatra I from the Crescent Star Party. Meanwhile, Jel Fathullah is running as a legislative candidate for the DPR RI in the electoral district of West Sumatra II from the Crescent Star Party.

This shows a shift in discourse from the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia which should reject the democratic system in a country, but several of its leaders participated in enlivening the democratic contestation by nominating themselves as legislative members of the DPR RI in West Sumatra Province. The reason these two figures decided to run as members of the DPR RI was because they thought that so far Indonesia had not experienced any changes in running the state system. Twenty years after reform, Indonesia is still experiencing instability in the economy, injustice in law enforcement, where the law that applies in Indonesia comes from the Criminal Code (a product of

humans, not from the book of Allah) (Ahmad, 2021; Hermanto, 2023; Jalal, 2019).

Since the founding of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia until now, there have been several changes in preaching and internal conflicts which have led to the emergence of several factions. The factions within the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia so far include the alliance faction of Abu Bakar Ba'syir with a jihadist style of preaching, then M. Talib who emphasizes preaching through knowledge, Irfianda Abidin and Jel Fathullah with a political mission. The tension that occurred internally in the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia made Ba'asyir leave the Mujahidin Council in 2008, but after being led by M. Talib, the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia became an ordinary mass organization that was no longer well known.

The missionary journey of the Mujahidin Council, which is based in Yogyakarta, has apparently begun to move to the West Sumatra region with the presence of two figures from the Mujahidin Council, namely Irfianda Abidin and Jel Fathullah, to run as legislative candidates (Anwar 2018). The dynamics of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia's journey from 2000 to the present in terms of the state system are indeed very high. The mission of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia organization will not change as long as Indonesia still uses a democratic system and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia continues to oversee the realization of an Islamic caliphate system.

Jel Fathullah and Irfianda Abidin were figures who led the struggle of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia in the contestation of Indonesian democracy. They apparently came from the West Sumatra region. Their presence in West Sumatra caused a wave of revival of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia which, after being abandoned by Abu Bakar Ba'syir, had receded and was initially popular in the Yogyakarta area and its surroundings.

The dynamics and struggles of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia above are a description and an important part of the reason researchers researched several factions and strategies of identity politics within the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia. This research will at least produce a new perspective in understanding and researching the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia. The Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia is an Islamic organization based in Yogyakarta but its existence has shifted to the West Sumatra area. This is what made the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia struggle hard and adapt to clashes with other mass organizations.

METHODOLOGY

This research methodology uses a qualitative approach with a case study method to deeply understand the dynamics of political factionalism occurring within Islamic mass organizations (ormas). This approach was chosen because the phenomenon of factionalism is complex, contextual, and involves social, ideological, and political interactions among organizational actors. This study combines field research and library research. Field research was conducted to obtain primary data through direct observation of organizational activities, in-depth interviews with administrators, members, and key figures, and the review of internal organizational documents such as meeting minutes and structural decisions. Meanwhile, library research was conducted to review relevant literature in the form of books, journal articles, research reports, and other scientific sources to strengthen the theoretical framework and interpret field findings more comprehensively.

The research location was purposively determined, namely the Islamic organization Majelis Mujahidin, which exhibits significant political factional dynamics. Research subjects included central administrators, active members, and former members who had direct experience in the emergence or development of internal factions. Data were collected through observation, in-depth interviews, documentation, and literature review. All data were analyzed using qualitative descriptive analysis methods through three stages: data reduction, data presentation, and conclusion drawing. Data validity was maintained through triangulation of sources and methods, and confirmation of analysis results with informants to ensure accuracy of interpretation. The research stages included problem identification and preliminary studies, field and literature data collection, analysis of findings by linking them to Islamic political theory and organizational theory, and preparation of a final report. With this method, the research is expected to deeply uncover the patterns, causes, and implications of political factionalization within Islamic organizations, from ideological, structural, and socio-political aspects.

DISCUSSION

Genealogy of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia

The fall of the New Order became the starting point for various socio-political changes that were very decisive for the future of a nation, and at that time Indonesia was experiencing a transition period. According to Philippe C. Schmitter, the transition period is characterized as a change of power. This transition phase is also marked by increasing socio-political turmoil as a result of increasing demands for people's participation and empowerment (Donnel & Philippe, 1993). These demands are usually always accompanied by increasing other demands, namely demands for recognition of special identities or indigenous communities.

In some regions, these demands take the form of assertions of special cultural, linguistic or ethnic heritage. Meanwhile, in other cases, the demand takes the form of affirming the validity of a religious message or tradition. As a country whose majority population is Muslim, after the fall of the New Order authoritarian regime, Indonesia experienced a phenomenon that had never existed before, where demands for the legitimacy of religious identity, especially Islam, emerged very strongly. This is marked by the re-emergence of various Islamic political idioms and symbols as well as a structural orientation in Islamizing society or known as "Political Islam" (Azra, 2000).

The rise of religious (Islamic) movements in various regions in Indonesia in the form of regional regulations with nuances of Islamic law has historical continuity (Diani, 2000). The birth of this movement was a result of poor state attitudes and policies resulting from an incomplete reform process. Therefore, when an Islamic-based alternative ideology emerged that was able to intertwine with the spirit of local identity, the discourse on implementing Islamic law became increasingly stronger. The bad experience of state hegemony over Islam during the New Order era further increased the enthusiasm of this movement. The movement to enforce Islamic law that has emerged in various regions is a backflow to reform. The tendency is to form a theocratic communal attitude among followers of the religion (Islam). This is contrary to the spirit of the reform movement which wants to uphold democratic principles in Indonesia's pluralistic society.

The current of this movement is strengthening and tends to be radical in articulating its ideology. This gave rise to sectarian politics, which have mushroomed in society since the reform era began. Among

the Indonesian Islamic community, the widespread movement to implement Islamic law has given rise to pros and cons. For people who support this movement, they consider it natural that Indonesia, whose population is predominantly Muslim, applies Islamic law (Putri, 2019). So it is very true what Ali Sodikin said that the existence of the movement to enforce Islamic law has historical roots since pre-independence times. The state's poor attitude towards Muslims, especially in the political field, has reignited the enthusiasm of the movement. The development of Islamic movements in Islamic countries has also encouraged the strengthening of the existence of this movement. Transnational movements become a means of connecting, making their scope increasingly wider. The roots of internal historicity and the influence of external reality became ammunition for the emergence of this religious movement (Sodikin, 2015).

This group believes that implementing Islamic law is not just a formality, but a religious obligation for Muslims. However, there are also those who oppose and are worried about the impact of implementing Islamic law which is considered to endanger national unity. According to this group, Islamic law does not need to be implemented through law. However, there are also errors in understanding and implementation of this movement, which always links the implementation of Islamic law with the development of an Islamic state (Muntoha, 2010).

On August 5-7 2000, around 1800 people from 24 representatives from all over Indonesia and outside Indonesia attended a consensus deliberation which resulted in an agreement to form the MMI as a *tansiq* or alliance of Muslims who fought to enforce Islamic law in Indonesia and also created the Yogyakarta charter which contains aspirations to expand the enforcement of Islamic law in various other regions of the world. Therefore, with the increasingly active spirit of enforcing Islamic law, it is important for the Indonesian people to take the values of Islamic teachings and state practices from the time of the Prophet as a basis for life as well as a reference for current state administration.

This kind of understanding has led to the emergence of various Islamic alliances in Indonesia, one of which is the MMI. This community firmly wants the formalization and legitimacy of religion in the political system in Indonesia. Islamic Sharia for them is a must to be implemented in the lives of Muslims. They started enforcing the Shari'a themselves (*ibda' binafsi*) and then spread it. History shows that the

initial existence of the MMI was marked by a declaration at the first congress on 5-7 August 2000 which was held at the Mandala Bhakti Wanita Tama Building, Yogyakarta (Chusna, 2014).

Enforcement of sharia (*Taṭbīq as-Syarī'ah*) was the theme chosen for the congress. A total of 1,800 people with various backgrounds from 24 provinces attended the event. The quality of this congress was increased by the presence of several intellectuals, including Deliar Noer who is a historian, Tidjanijauhari who is an NU figure from Madura and Fuad Amsyari from Airlangga University Surabaya. The solidarity of several Islamic alliances was seen at this event with the presence of representatives from the Mujahideen Command, Laskar Santri, Persis, Badr Company, Taliban Brigade and Laskar Jundullah from political parties. Also present were representatives from the Justice Party which has now become the Social Justice Party, the Islamic Community Party and the United Development Party (Yahya, 2018).

The First Congress of the MMI carried the theme of jihad, imamate and caliphate as the characteristic of its organization. At the congress, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was elected as *āmir* and coordinator of AHWA (*Ahl Ḥalli wa al-Aqd*) along with its members such as Muchtar Na'im, Deliar Noer, Ali Yafie, Mawardi Noor, Ahmad Syahirul Alim, Alawi Muhammad and A.M Syaifuddin. Irfan S. Awwas was appointed as chairman of his *tanfidziyah* lajnah (Turmudi and Sihbudi, 2005) and M. Talib as deputy *āmir*. They also agreed on several joint commitments to guide their work. The Yogyakarta *Ṣaḥīfah* or Yogyakarta charter is the result of that extraordinary congress. This Islamic organization which was founded in Yogyakarta became increasingly widely known under the leadership of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.

As previously explained, the MMI has a clear vision in its struggle which is stated in the *Ṣaḥīfah* Yogyakarta or Yogyakarta charter which contains the following important matters: 1) the obligation to implement Islamic law for Muslims in Indonesia and the world as a whole; 2) rejection of all ideologies that are contrary to Islam which cause shirk and *nifāq* as well as violations of human rights; 3) building a solid and strong Mujahideen *ṣaf* unit, both at the national, regional and international (international) levels; 4) the formation of the Mujahideen Council by the Indonesian mujahideen to realize the *Imamah* (caliphate/leadership) of the people, both within the country and within the unity of Muslims throughout the world; 5) a call to Muslims to

mobilize da'wah and jihad throughout the world for the sake of upholding Islam as *rahmat li al-'alamin* (Eric, 2010; Sholehuddin, 2013).

The group which has offices on Karanglo, Kotagede street, Yogyakarta city has a mission to strive to uphold the teachings of Islam in a *kaffah* (perfect) manner through Islamic activities that are based on Islamic law correctly and cleanly and are free from polytheism in all aspects of human life, both in worship and social relations. Apart from that, the MMI is also active in the scope of state life related to issues of selecting leaders, regulating state economic governance and enacting positive laws. This Islamic group, which has representatives throughout Indonesia, also states that it is a group that cares about the welfare of the community and the improvement of the country through correct methods for implementation.

They tried to unite all the strengths and potential of the *Muslim Ummah* (mujahideen) based on their goals. They have the aim of fighting together for the establishment and upholding of Islamic law in all systems of human life, so that Islamic law becomes the main reference in carrying out government systems and decision making and public policies on a domestic and international scale. Among the important things they are fighting for is the establishment of Islamic law in a comprehensive and comprehensive manner, fighting for the return of the Jakarta Charter in amendments to the 1945 Constitution, which for them the deletion of seven words in the past was a form of state betrayal of Muslims, fighting for the establishment of an Islamic state, uniting various other Islamic components and groups that have the same goals, do not agree with ideologies other than Islam and make the United States a big enemy.

Characteristics of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia Movement

The Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, as previously stated, is not fighting to fight or even destroy the unity of the state, but rather what they want is to uphold Islamic law in various aspects of Muslim life, including in the constitutional system. For them, enforcing Islamic law is a form of implementing the values contained in the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila. In the first principle, belief in the Almighty God, is the legitimacy of the constitution which is used as their philosophical basis in fighting for Islamic teachings as a unifying element of the nation (M. Tholib, 2013).

So far, the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia has felt uneasy about the conditions that have occurred so that efforts to uphold Islamic teachings and values are their response to this anxiety. According to them, currently Islam is in a stagnant phase and is in the abyss of ignorance and progress so that Islam only occupies the back row in the government system. As a result of constant anxiety, they finally formulated an orientation for the activities held last November 2015. At the Mudzakar National Conference, M. Talib was appointed as *āmir* for his two families and emphasized their long-standing commitment, namely fighting for Islamic law as the main foundation of the state government system (SK MM, 2015).

M. Talib as a leader of the Islamic community cannot be underestimated. The reason is, he is a quite mature Muslim scholar. He has many works outlined in many writings, including commentaries on the Al-Qur'an. From this background he pioneered the "jihad through the pen" movement. He built this breakthrough in order to get more attention from his readers, either through print or online media (M. Tholib, 2010). Through Islamic awareness, the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia forms its character as an Islamic community by encouraging its cadres based on *hujjah naqliyah* and *hujjan aqliyah* to always dedicate themselves in fighting for the practice of Islamic wisdom. As an effect of a person's perfect faith, the implementation of Islamic law is carried out throughout his life through real and serious jihad.

The Indonesian Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia must have the principle of always basing its life on unity and solidarity among Muslims. Between the leadership of M. Talib and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir there were prominent differences, resulting in differences in the characteristics of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia between the two different periods of leadership. M. Talib has a calmer leadership style than Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's more assertive and courageous leadership made the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia better known and popular. Meanwhile, M. Talib places more emphasis on strengthening the knowledge and intellect of his members. During M. Talib's leadership, his popularity was not as popular as during the time of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Although during M. Talib's time many of their activities were controversial and widely covered by the media. Strengthening the literacy of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia community carried out by M. Talib had indeed been on his agenda since he was given the mandate to become leader (Yahya, 2010).

As a result of these differences in character, the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia has 3 typologies of groups within it that share the same struggle for Islam. The three alliance typologies are:

Tansiqul fardi

Tansiqul fardi: This means bringing together Muslim individuals to fight for the Shari'a regardless of the background of the mass organization, except for sects that do not conform to Islamic beliefs, such as Shi'a and Ahmadiyah. It is hoped that each of these individuals will become an accelerator for the enforcement of Islamic law, for example someone with a background in the Muhammadiyah organization is expected to accelerate the enforcement of Islamic law in their organization, as well as those with a background in Nahdlatul Ulama Organization and so on.

Tansiqul fardi

Tansiqul Amali: or program alliance, meaning working together with organizations, such as NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, MUI, Religious Council, universities etc. In this alliance, cooperation is carried out in order to accelerate the enforcement of Islamic law, either in collaboration with the community or with the government. In addition, they collaborate with various elements of society and other Islamic communities in implementing programs aimed at advancing society, developing the economy and building a bureaucracy based on Islamic teachings. One of the collaborations they have carried out is collaboration in a discussion with the theme of comparison between Islamic law and positional law which was held together with the Indonesian Islamic University (UII). The scientific discussion was attended by experts from the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, legal experts and representatives of experts from other religions. The experts who took part in the discussion stated that religious law is one of the sources used in ratifying national laws. It was also stated at the meeting that Islamic laws have advantages compared to positive law.

Apart from that, the participation of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia was also seen when their representatives were speakers at an international seminar with the theme "Jihad from an Islamic View". In an event organized by the Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta and attended by important people from the police, intellectuals and several ambassadors from friendly countries, MM representatives issued a

statement that national defense and state security could be strengthened by jihad, which was later confirmed to be true by the audience. If these participants should understand jihad as they have conveyed it, then how naive it would be if the acts of jihad they carry out are often associated with acts of terrorism.

Tansiq al-Nidzami

Tansiq al-Nidzami: which means that the struggle to uphold Islamic teachings can be carried out by uniting all levels of society who gather in one forum called the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia. However, this alliance is very difficult or even impossible to realize considering that every Islamic community that has existed so far has its own programs and goals.

Factors causing the emergence of conflicts and factions in the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia

Internal conflict occurred during the post-Abu Bakar Ba'asyir dispute with the ideology adopted by the MMI, M. Talib's version of jihad also had a different character in strengthening this religious organization with diplomacy and dialogue methods. Nowadays is not the time to keep carrying weapons in battle, but to discuss and dialogue together with justifiable arguments. This is proven by the opening of open dialogue by the MMI with Islamic groups or even groups outside Islam (Dliya'ul, 2013).

Since it was formed and approved at the first congress on August 5 2000 in Yogyakarta, the MMI, in the process of realizing its ideals, namely upholding Islamic teachings, has had several agendas that they have drawn up, including: 1) demanding that in political life and nation, carry out their government in accordance with the true teachings of Islam, 2) invite Islamic communities and Islamic parties to unite to build Islamic power so that Islamic law can be enforced, 3) create a system of government that provides guarantees for the full implementation of Islamic teachings to its adherents and continue to provide space for the freedom of other religions to practice their religious teachings, and 4) disseminate their understandings through the mass media that they officially own.

Once again, the cause of the chaos and the emergence of various problems that have befallen Muslims since the founding of the Indonesian state until now is that Islamic law has not been implemented in its government system. They think that Indonesia, with a majority

Muslim population, is controlled by inappropriate people. Therefore, to fight for its commitment, the Mujahideen Council formed representatives of the Mujahideen Lascars in each region.

The struggle to enforce Islamic law became a big theme at the First MMI Congress led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir at that time because there were several reasons behind it, namely:

Ideological Reasons

The leaders of the MMI agreed that every Muslim individual who has the correct creed definitely has the desire for Islamic law to be applied in every line of life as a form of application of his faith and to avoid all forms of misery.

Historical Reasons

As is understood in the sirah, the caliphate or Islamic system of government was the system used by the Prophet, continued by his companions and inherited by his successors until it ended during the Ottoman Empire. This period was the time when Islam reached the peak of its glory. By maintaining the unity of their people, they welcome much progress and civilization.

Reasons for Changing Times

Changing times is a *sunnatullah* that is difficult or even unavoidable. Now, the world is facing an era of globalization, modernization and westernization. Apart from having a positive impact, these global issues also have a negative impact, one of which is moral decline. Islam specifically is now faced with various long-lasting dimensional problems. For the MMI, the offer to return to the Koran and Sunnah is one way to deal with all these problems.

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's concern for his commitment to the MMI can also be seen in his firm stance in rejecting Megawati's appointment as state leader. In the Islamic community, women's leadership is a matter of debate. Indeed, some communities allow a woman to be a leader, but this is only allowed in emergency situations. For the MMI, Megawati's appointment at that time could not be said to be an emergency. Because an emergency condition is a condition related to matters of life and death, whereas at that time there were still many alternatives that could be used as other options, namely there were still several candidates who had the ability and had an Islamic vision (Mubarak, 2008).

In 2008, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir left the MMI on the grounds that the leadership system and organizational structure of this assembly no longer followed Islamic rules. Ba'asyir criticized that orders and decisions should lie with the emir, not with the *tanfidziah lajnah*. The position of the emir in Islam is in the highest place, therefore he should be obeyed and heard.

Meanwhile, according to M. Talib, the concept of *Imamah* and the single leadership model proposed by Ba'asyir is a Shiite leadership model. This difference in views caused disharmony between Ba'asyir as amir and M. Talib as deputy amir in the structure of the Mujahideen Council. Ba'asyir accused the MMI of no longer sharing the law, the Mujahideen Council was secular, mainly because of the existing leadership system. For Ba'asyir, the model of periodic and collective collegial leadership in the MMI followed the Jewish style.

This view made Ba'asyir leave the MMI on July 19 2008. Ba'asyir's resignation was also purely his own, and there was no pressure from outside. According to him, all this time Abu Bakar Ba'asyir had actually been carrying out da'wah within the MMI. However, many members of the MMI did not agree with the improvements implemented by Ba'asyir.

On 9-10 August 2008 the Third Congress was successfully held by the MMI. Previously, this congress was threatened with lack of fans due to accusations and Ba'asyir's departure from the ranks of Laskar Mujahidin. This third congress appointed Talib as the new leader and new hope for the Mujahideen Council. Talib was decided to lead AHWA and at the same time become emir, while the daily management remained with Irfan S. Awwas. Since receiving this new mandate, M. Talib has been committed to upholding the Shari'a through strengthening the MMI in the fields of knowledge and physics (Abdul Jamil, 2023).

It could be said that Talib's steps to strengthen the MMI in the field of knowledge could surpass Ba'asyir's achievements, but in the field of physical actions he could not yet surpass Ba'asyir's achievements. The culmination of Talib's achievements in the MMI was the publication of Corrections to the Indonesian Ministry of Religion's Tarjamah Harfiyah al-Qur'an: Review of *Aqidah*, *Sharia*, *Mu'amalah*, *Iqtishadiyyah* and Al-Qur'an al-Karim.

On June 14 2012 there was a commotion within the MMI which caused M. Talib to resign as AHWA, but its members rejected the letter of resignation that had been submitted by M. Talib. At the IV Mujahidin

Council Congress in Sentul City, Bogor on 25 August 2013 and the V Mujahidin Council Congress in Tasikmalaya 7 August 2018, M. Talib was elected for the second and third times as emir of the Mujahidin Council (Aziz, 2012).

Under the command of M. Talib, the MMI seems to no longer be as popular as it was under Ba'asyir's control, although it is still often seen carrying out social actions, recitations and physical cadre formation. Ahead of the Indonesian democracy party in 2019, there were two figures from the MMI, namely Jel. Fathullah as deputy emir and Irfianda Abidin as deputy treasurer are running for membership in the DPR RI in the West Sumatra region. These two figures are of the view that the MMI under the "pen jihad" preached by M. Talib received little attention in society. If we look at the period of Ba'asyir's leadership, the number of members of the MMI was almost seven million, whereas currently the number of members of the MMI is less than five thousand. This shows that the existence of the MMI declined sharply during the three periods of Amir M. Talib's leadership.

Jel Fathullah and Irfianda Abidin consider that da'wah in the modern era is no longer through violence or using the pen, but rather through practical political means so that the voice that Muslims want is truly conveyed in a law. Since 2019, Fathullah and Abidin have not only run for legislative positions, but have also campaigned and provided support to every candidate they consider capable of becoming sharia leaders. Fathullah also gathered all the preachers of West Sumatra to gather at the Fathullah Center Ujung Gurun, Padang City to pray for the candidate pair for governor of West Sumatra, Nasrul Abid and Indra Catri, to be truly elected.

M. Talib regretted that the actions taken by Fathullah and Abidin as leaders of the *AHWA* MMI from West Sumatra plunged into practical politics. Talib emphasized that the birth of the MMI meant that the Indonesian state system after the New Order was a secular system, democracy was a system of kufr because the law used was not based on Allah SWT. By nominating himself as a legislative member of the DPR RI, of course he violates the basic rules of the *Mujahideen Council* which have been mutually agreed upon. For this reason, there will be a warning to Fathullah and Abidin so that members of the MMI are not ambiguous in implementing the Islamic law that has been established by the emir of the Mujahidin Council.

Islamic Political Thought of Jel Fathullah and Irfianda Abidin

Jel Fathullah and Irfianda Abidin believe that Pancasila as the basis of the state shows an inconsistent attitude. TAP MPR XVIII of 1998 revoked P4 and emphasized Pancasila as the basis of the state. Previously TAP MPRS XXV/1966 included Pancasila as the basis of the State. However, according to the 1945 Constitution, article 29 paragraph 1 states: The Indonesian state is based on belief in one Almighty God, not based on Pancasila. In this regard, there is a basic inconsistency in the state.

According to Fathullah, the basis of a state in accordance with the Constitution is a state based on the belief in One Almighty God. The original explanation by implementing the Shari'a. Only those developed by nationalists come out of that context. In the explanation of countries that implement religious law. All based on religious law. Those who don't have sharia don't manage the country. Do Christians have Sharia? For example, the marriage law is because in Islam there is sharia. Other religions do not have marriage laws.

Meanwhile, Irfianda Abidin responded to the government that what we are looking at is whether the orders or regulations issued are in accordance with Islamic law or not. For example, during the DKI Jakarta regional elections, the emir of the Mujahidin Council helped push through his supporters for Jokowi to advance to Jakarta. However, this is solely so that later the DKI governor can change the habit of always holding *shalawatan* feasts at the City Hall of the DKI governor's complex. He believes that such events should be changed to provide compensation to people in need. In full, the treasurer of the MMI, Abidin, said:

“Jokowi's rise to Jakarta (Governor) was also proposed by the MMI to his supporters. If that's the case, finish off the Habibs who sell religion to get food. Finish the prayer festival that they attended. It's fine if you want to give alms, there are many poor orphans who need it, not habibs. Throw everything out of the governor's office, finish it off. Once Jokowi ascended, there were no more prayer festivals in the DKI governorate. If the MMI communicates/dialogues together, they will continue to finish it off. Why? Their cheater. Claiming to be descendants of the prophet, all humans are descendants of the prophet, prophet Adam”

In the Preamble to the 45th paragraph of the 45th Constitution, it is stated: ... then the Indonesian National Independence was formulated in a Constitution of the State of Indonesia, which was formed in the structure of the Republic of Indonesia which is the sovereignty of the people based on the belief in the Almighty God, Just and Civilized Humanity. Indonesian Unity and Democracy which is led by wisdom in Deliberation/Representation, and by realizing social justice for all Indonesian people.

The 4th paragraph of the Preamble to the '45 Constitution above states that there are 4 foundations of the state, namely: 1. Belief in One Almighty God 2. Just and Civilized Humanity 3. Indonesian Unity 4. Democracy led by wisdom in Deliberation/Representation.

If we adhere to the '45 Constitution, then the Republic of Indonesia is actually based on the Islamic religion. Because the term Almighty God is an Islamic concept, not a concept of secularism, democracy or liberalism. These three isms do not know God. Therefore, stating that the Republic of Indonesia is based on Pancasila with social justice for all Indonesian people as one of its principles is an act of deviation from the '45 Constitution, because it is not in accordance with the text of the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution.

According to Fathullah, we do not find the practice of Pancasila in line with the slogan that is heralded as unifying the nation, protecting citizens. Those who are considered diggers and defenders of Pancasila, in practice actually betray Pancasila. This can be proven by various events such as the end of the Soekarno regime culminating in the murder of the generals in Lubang Buaya. Likewise, the Soeharto regime culminated in the DOM (Military Operational Area) in Aceh and the riots in May 1998. Meanwhile, during the current reform era it only produced corruption and structural impoverishment.

CONCLUSION

The Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin) is a religious organization that seeks to enforce Islamic law within the Indonesian state system. The organization was officially established through the First Mujahidin Congress held in Yogyakarta on August 7, 2000, with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir elected as its first emir. During his nearly eight years of leadership, Ba'asyir emphasized a militant-oriented da'wah approach, even with elements of violence and terror. He also considered the

Mujahidin Council's organizational structure to not fully reflect Islamic sharia principles, as decision-making mechanisms were dominated by the leadership of the Lajnah Tanfidziyah (the Islamic Youth Leadership Council) rather than by the emir as the supreme leader.

Following the Second Congress, differences of opinion emerged between Ba'asyir and his deputy, M. Thalib. Thalib viewed Ba'asyir's leadership system as resembling Shia practices, as it was centered on a specific figure and lacked open deliberation. He emphasized that Islamic da'wah should be carried out in the spirit of rahmatan lil alamin (blessing for the universe), not through violence. This ideological conflict gave rise to internal conflict and split the organization into several factions in 2008. At the Third Congress, M. Thalib was finally elected amir and led until the Fifth Congress in Tasikmalaya in 2018. However, during his leadership, the Mujahidin Council's da'wah activities and cadre development showed a significant decline.

Following the 2019 congress, internal divisions resurfaced when two prominent figures, Irfianda Abidin and Jel Fathullah, ran for legislative seats in the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI) from West Sumatra. This political move sparked differences in the organization's direction, particularly regarding the implementation of the Jihad Pena concept under the leadership of M. Thalib. The two then formed a new political faction in West Sumatra, seeking to champion Islamic politics within the framework of sharia through participation in Indonesia's formal political system. They argued that political involvement was necessary for the Mujahidin Council to contribute to the formation of national laws and policies more in line with the principles of Islamic justice.

In practice, the Fathullah and Abidin factions actively participated in political campaigns at various levels, from mayoral elections to presidential elections. They also rejected the Joint Decree (SKB) of the Three Ministers in the Padang Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) as a form of criticism of policies deemed detrimental to Muslims. Thus, since its founding in 2000 until now, the Mujahidin Council has experienced internal fragmentation which has given birth to three main currents: the Abu Bakar Ba'asyir faction with a jihadist orientation, the M. Thalib faction with a moderate approach, and the Irfianda Abidin–Jel Fathullah political faction with a strategy of participation in the national political system.

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